Module 15 · 13 sections

Traps & Common Failures

The mistakes that fail SCIF inspections, by phase and system: why each fails, the fix, and whether the source is primary, checklist, UFC or practitioner.

On this page

15.01Top 25 inspection killers
15.02Planning and paperwork traps
15.03Perimeter and ceiling traps
15.04Door and lock traps
15.05Penetration and utility traps
15.06Acoustic traps
15.07Intrusion detection traps
15.08Access control traps
15.09RED/BLACK and filter traps
15.10Shielding and installer damage traps
15.11PED, telecom and CCTV traps
15.12Life safety and AHJ conflict traps
15.13Naming and version traps

15.01

Top 25 inspection killers

Common failures that stop accreditation or force rework, compiled from primary requirements and practitioner reports; details follow. Source type: Primary = federal text; Checklist = DNI checklist; UFC = DoD design criteria; Practitioner = industry or manufacturer.

#	Trap	Why it fails	Fix	Source type
1	Contract awarded before the CSP is approved	UFC 1-15; Tech Spec 3.B	AO approves the CSP before award and the final design before construction starts	Primary / UFC
2	Walls stop at the drop ceiling or leave deck-flute gaps	Not true floor to true ceiling	Slab to slab; seal tracks	Primary
3	Recessed boxes or cabinets in a treated perimeter wall	Tech Spec 3.G.5	Surface mount, raceway or furred wall	Primary
4	Fasteners or hangers through an RF shield	Hidden leak	Brackets, strut, furring; report any hole	Primary / Practitioner
5	Large duct without bars, grilles or inspection port	Tech Spec 3.G.7	Bars or baffles plus port	Primary
6	Other tenants' utilities transit the SCIF	Tech Spec 3.G.3	Reroute or AO-approved mitigation	Primary
7	Metallic penetration missing CTTA-directed treatment	Tech Spec 3.G.2	Build to the CTTA review	Primary
8	Spare conduit left open	Tech Spec 3.G.6	Acoustic fill and cap	Primary
9	Untested mix of door, frame and seals	UFC 3-4.6.1	Factory-tested assembly	UFC
10	Deadlatch, extra deadbolts or exterior hardware on exit-only door	Tech Spec 3.E	FF-L-2890 type per door	Primary
11	Exit-only door not alarmed 24/7 with local annunciator	Tech Spec 3.E.4	Alarm and annunciate	Primary
12	Electric strike treated as the lock; fail-safe maglock	ICS 705-1; UFC 3-4.6.5	FF-L-2740 on FF-L-2890; fail-secure UL 1034	Primary / UFC
13	Perimeter door lacks Level II HSS plus motion	Tech Spec 7.A.3.a(7), 7.A.2.d	UL 634 Level II and motion	Primary
14	PCU or keypad outside the SCIF	Tech Spec 7.A.3.b(1)	Locate inside	Primary
15	Sensor cable in uncontrolled space, unprotected	Tech Spec 7.A.2.e	Inside, encrypted or sealed ferrous conduit	Primary
16	Factory-default IDS codes	Tech Spec 7.A.3.b(11)	Change at commissioning	Primary
17	Standby power under 24 hours or uncalculated	Tech Spec 7.B.5	Documented calculation	Primary
18	Mercantile certificate, or not Extent 3	Tech Spec 7.A.2.a–b	UL 2050 NISS certificate	Primary
19	No acceptance test records	Tech Spec 7.D.3	Record walk and tamper tests	Primary
20	ACS head-end outside the SCIF or cloud-hosted	FFC C.1	SCIF or SECRET controlled area	Checklist
21	Unencrypted reader lines leaving the SCIF	FFC C.1	FIPS encryption or AO-approved method	Checklist
22	Cameras inside or viewing in	UFC 3-4.17.2	Exterior entrance camera only	UFC
23	Unapproved phones; speakers with audio back-feed	FFC F.1–F.2, G	Approved instruments; isolation	Checklist
24	VTC room built to Sound Group 3	UFC 3-4.3.2	Sound Group 4	UFC
25	No photo record; untracked field changes	UFC 4-7	Photo log; SSM and AO concurrence	UFC / Practitioner

Sources UFC 4-010-05 · IC Tech Spec v1.5.1 · IC Tech Spec, Ch. 5–end (v1.4 archive; text source) · ICS 705-1 · Fixed Facility Checklist v1.5 · CenCore: SCIF construction Q&A (practitioner)

15.02

Planning and paperwork traps

Most expensive failures start before anyone picks up a tool.

Trap	Why it fails	Fix	Source type
Engaging the AO after design, material orders or contracts	Tech Spec 2.A: coordinate "before construction design, material ordering, or contracts are finalized"	Meet the AO as soon as the requirement is known	Primary
Awarding the contract before the CSP is approved	"Do not award a construction contract without an approved CSP"	Make CSP approval a procurement precondition	Primary / UFC
Trusting "SCIF-ready" or "pre-accredited" modular claims	Tech Spec Ch. 3: such claims "may not be accurate"	Submit product documentation to the AO like any design	Primary
Exceeding the standard "to be safe"	Requires a waiver, and a waiver removes mandatory reciprocity	Build to the approved design	Primary
Sending a waiver to the AO	ICD 705: the waiver official may never be the AO	Route per ICD 705	Primary
Building "to ICD 705" instead of to the approved drawings	The AO accredits what was approved and documented	Build to drawings; RFIs through the SSM	Practitioner
Leaving the SSM out of meetings and RFIs	The SSM is often the only ICD 705 contact	Copy the SSM on all coordination	Practitioner
Incomplete DoD accreditation package	DoDM 5105.21 Vol. 2 lists the final FFC, IDS spec sheets, UL 2050 certificate, NIST certificate, IDS test results and a catastrophic failure plan	Track package items from design	Primary
"TBD" left on the final FFC	The complete FFC and TEMPEST addendum are due before completion	Close every TBD before submission	Primary
TEMPEST addendum submitted late	ICS 705-1: plan RF shielding "during initial construction"; UFC 1-19.3 puts the addendum in planning	Submit in planning	Primary / UFC
Handling SCIF plans like ordinary documents	Tech Spec 3.B: protect plans "in accordance with the CSP"	Controlled distribution; no open bid portals	Primary
Treating reported 2025–2026 ODNI memos as settled	Not publicly posted; later changes reported	Get current direction from the AO in writing	Practitioner

Sources IC Tech Spec v1.5.1 · ICD 705 · ICS 705-1 · UFC 4-010-05 · DoDM 5105.21 Vol. 2 · SAME 2026, Concept to Clearance (practitioner) · Cushman & Wakefield: POA&M rescission (industry)

15.03

Perimeter and ceiling traps

The perimeter has to resist entry, show evidence of tampering and hold sound. Concealed work is where it fails.

Trap	Why it fails	Fix	Source type
Walls stop at the ceiling grid or leave gaps at deck flutes	Not true floor to true ceiling; acoustic and visual-evidence failure	Slab-to-slab walls; fill flutes; seal tracks	Primary
No acoustic sealant at top and bottom tracks	Flanking path; UFC 3-4.4.5 wants "non-hardening caulk" on both sides	Seal before board goes on	Primary / UFC
Loose insulation; board joints aligned on the same stud	Tech Spec Wall A notes; UFC 3-4.4.2 staggered joints	Fasten insulation; stagger joints	Primary / UFC
Recessed boxes, extinguisher cabinets or PED cabinets in the perimeter	Tech Spec 3.G.5; UFC 3-4.4.8 and 3-4.7	Surface mount or furred wall; PED lockers outside	Primary / UFC
Notching the expanded metal or plywood layer for cable	Removes forced-entry resistance and visual evidence; unexplained patches draw findings	Plan entries before the layer, with an AO-approved detail	Practitioner
Wall type picked before storage mode and SID are settled	Mode and SID drive Wall A vs. B/C and alarm response	Decide the SCIF profile in planning	Primary
Ceiling plenum or raised floor open to non-SCIF space	The AO may require plenum motion or other mitigation	Settle it on the pre-construction checklist and CSP	Practitioner
Above-ceiling congestion that blocks inspection	UFC 3-4.1.1: minimize obstructions on both sides of the perimeter	Coordinate routing and access with the SSM	UFC
No photos of wall assemblies before close-up	UFC 4-7 photographic record; inspectors can't see inside walls	Photograph each segment with a location reference	UFC
Untreated accessible windows	Tech Spec 3.F	Treat per Tech Spec and AO	Primary

See: Perimeter Construction & Vaults.

Sources IC Tech Spec v1.5.1 · UFC 4-010-05 · IC Tech Spec, Ch. 5–end (v1.4 archive; text source) · Pete Milham: ICD 705 construction (practitioner)

15.04

Door and lock traps

A door-hardware practitioner writes: "Most SCIF doors fail to pass accreditation as a result of poor installations, not defective products."

Trap	Why it fails	Fix	Source type
Deadlatch where an FF-L-2890 deadbolt is required	Tech Spec 3.E sets hardware by door category	FF-L-2890 type per door in the schedule	Primary
Extra standalone or flush deadbolts on secondary or exit-only doors	Prohibited by UFC 3-4.6.8 and 3-4.6.10	FF-L-2890 device only	UFC
Exterior hardware on an exit-only door	Tech Spec 3.E.4	Blank exterior face	Primary
Exit-only door without 24/7 alarm and local audible annunciator	Tech Spec 3.E.4	24-hour zone and annunciator	Primary
Door, frame and seals bought separately	UFC 3-4.6.1: factory tested per ASTM E90, STC 50 for an STC 45 perimeter	Tested assembly, installed as a unit	UFC
Rough opening not plumb, level and square	Doors bind, seals leak	Survey openings before frames	Practitioner
Hold-open closer, or closer outside	UFC 3-4.6.4: "heavy-duty automatic non-hold door-closer installed internal to the perimeter"	Non-hold closer inside	UFC
Removable hinge pins exposed outside	UFC 3-4.6.6.1: tamper resistant unless on the protected side	Secured pins	Primary / UFC
Glass lites or sidelites	UFC 3-4.6: "solid with no lites or sidelites"	Solid leaves	UFC
One contact on a double door	Each leaf needs its own alarm contact	Contact per leaf	Primary
FF-L-2937 locks, MIL-DTL-43607 padlocks or Class 5-A vault doors for classified	Those are AA&E items	Confirm with the DoD Lock Program	Primary
Non-listed door contacts	Level II HSS required	UL 634 Level II	Practitioner

Sources IC Tech Spec (NAVFAC mirror) · UFC 4-010-05 · DoD Lock Program: pedestrian door deadbolt devices · O'Haver: SCIF door tutorial (practitioner)

15.05

Penetration and utility traps

Every opening is a forced-entry, acoustic and TEMPEST question at the same time.

Trap	Why it fails	Fix	Source type
Duct over 96 sq in, with no dimension under 6 in, lacking bars, grilles or baffles	Tech Spec 3.G.7	Bars, grille or baffles per 3.G.7	Primary
No inspection access port	Tech Spec 3.G.7 requires one	Port inside, or outside with AO-approved high-security lock	Primary
Counting on IDS instead of duct bars	Tech Spec 3.G.7.c doesn't list IDS as a substitute	Bars or baffles; duct IDS only with written AO approval	Primary
Other areas' utilities crossing the SCIF	Tech Spec 3.G.3	Reroute, or mitigate with AO approval	Primary
Scattered utility entries	Tech Spec 3.G.4; UFC 3-4.11.1	One planned entry	Primary / UFC
Penetrations sealed on one side	UFC 3-4.11.3: seal both sides, finished to match	Seal both sides	UFC
Spare conduit left open	Tech Spec 3.G.6	Acoustic fill and cap	Primary
Cables unlabeled at entry	UFC 3-4.19	Label purpose and destination	UFC
Metallic conduit, pipe or duct without the treatment the CTTA directs	Tech Spec 3.G.2; UFC 3-4.11.2	Nonconductive union, flex break or grounding per the review	Primary / UFC
Duct silencers added late	UFC: backpressure "may significantly impact the HVAC system design"	Mechanical engineer sizes them in design	UFC
No firestop in rated assemblies	UFC 3-4.11.3: firestop "may be required"	Listed firestop that also seals acoustically	UFC

See: Penetrations, Utilities & Life Safety.

Sources IC Tech Spec v1.5.1 · UFC 4-010-05 · IC Tech Spec (NAVFAC mirror)

15.06

Acoustic traps

Acoustic protection keeps conversations from being overheard outside. It fails at doors, ducts and anything that bridges the wall.

Trap	Why it fails	Fix	Source type
VTC or amplified-audio room built to Sound Group 3	UFC 3-4.3.2 requires Sound Group 4 (STC 50)	Design for the room's likely future use	UFC
Treating a lab STC as the field result	Flanking paths lower field results; UFC 3-4.3.3 wants higher-rated components	Specify higher-rated assemblies; close flanking paths	UFC
Missing or misadjusted drop seals; doors that don't latch	Commonly reported door failure	Adjust seals and closer; recheck after seals set	Practitioner
Back-to-back or recessed boxes in the perimeter	Tech Spec 3.G.5	Surface mount or furred wall	Primary
Open plenum returns, or ducts without silencers or Z-duct	"All vents and ducts shall be protected to meet the acoustic requirements"	Silencers, Z-duct or double-wall acoustic duct	Primary / UFC
Hardening sealant at seams	UFC 3-4.4.5 calls for non-hardening caulk	Non-hardening acoustic sealant	UFC
Sound masking used to fix bad construction	Tech Spec 9.E treats masking as an AO-approved mitigation	Fix construction first	Primary
Masking generator outside, with an AM/FM receiver or recording capability	Tech Spec 9.E: inside the SCIF, no receiver, recording disabled	Standalone generator inside; wiring inside	Primary
Networked or Bluetooth masking products	Conflicts with the no-receiver, no-recording logic	Non-networked sources; AO and CTTA approval	Practitioner
Audio listening test run without AO approval	Tech Spec 9.C: "All non-instrumental tests must be approved by the AO"	Get the method approved	Primary
Instrumented tests by untrained staff	Tech Spec 9.C limits them to those "with training on audio testing techniques"	Qualified tester	Primary
Assuming instrumented NIC testing is always required	The AO decides	Ask which test applies	Practitioner

Sources UFC 4-010-05 · IC Tech Spec, Ch. 5–end (v1.4 archive; text source) · K.L. Security: acoustic protection (practitioner) · SPG: STC and testing, part II (practitioner) · PSC: acoustic mistakes (practitioner)

15.07

Intrusion detection traps

Tech Spec Chapter 7 references below come from a public v1.4 copy. Verify against v1.5.1.

Trap	Why it fails	Fix	Source type
Perimeter door with HSS but no motion, or motion with a standard contact	7.A.3.a(7) requires both	HSS and motion at every perimeter door	Primary
Level I or non-UL 634 switch on a new accreditation	7.A.2.d	UL 634 Level II	Primary
PCU or keypad outside the SCIF	7.A.3.b(1)	Inside; only SCIF personnel change modes	Primary
Sensor cable above a corridor ceiling; set-screw EMT fittings	7.A.2.e; 7.A.3.b(3)	Keep inside, encrypt, or closed and sealed ferrous conduit	Primary
Junction boxes outside without GSA-approved locks	7.A.2.e	Eliminate or lock	Primary
Entry delay over 30 seconds	7.A.3.a(6)	30 seconds or less	Primary
Default installer, master or maintenance codes	7.A.3.b(11)	Change at commissioning	Primary
Battery math omits communicators and network gear, or uses nameplate current	7.B.5 requires 24 hours	Measured currents; calculation in the FFC	Primary / Practitioner
IDS sharing a panel with fire or other systems	7.A.2.h	Dedicated IDS	Primary
Camera or microphone in an IDS device	7.A.2.l needs AO approval	Non-audio, non-video sensors	Primary
Mercantile certificate, not Extent 3, or not renewed after changes	7.A.2.a–b	UL 2050 NISS certificate from a CRZH-listed company	Primary
Repeated false alarms	7.A.2.p limits them per partition	Fix diffusers, heaters, microwave coverage through drywall	Primary / Practitioner
HSS gap drifts as seals set	7.D.3 thickness test fails later	Recheck at turnover and each semiannual test	Practitioner

See: Intrusion Detection & UL 2050 / Extent 3.

Sources IC Tech Spec, Ch. 5–end (v1.4 archive; text source) · UFC 4-010-05 · ICS 705-1 · UL CS-ASD-NISS instructions · Fixed Facility Checklist v1.5

15.08

Access control traps

Access control handles occupied, day-to-day entry. It never replaces the lock or the IDS.

Trap	Why it fails	Fix	Source type
Electric strike or ACS treated as the SCIF lock	An unoccupied SCIF is secured by the FF-L-2740 lock on the FF-L-2890 deadbolt with IDS armed	ACS for occupied access only	Primary
Fail-safe strikes or maglocks	UFC 3-4.6.5: "positive engagement, fail secure, and approved under UL 1034"	Fail-secure UL 1034 hardware	UFC
Secondary-door ACS active after hours	Tech Spec 3.E.3	Deactivate when unoccupied	Primary
REX that can be triggered from outside, or that shunts the IDS switch	Opens the door or masks an alarm	REX inside; mechanical egress; no IDS shunt	Practitioner
Head-end, server or database outside the SCIF, or cloud-hosted	FFC C.1	SCIF or SECRET controlled area	Checklist
Unencrypted reader wiring leaving the SCIF	FFC C.1; Tech Spec 8.C.3 (v1.4 text)	FIPS AES encryption or AO-approved installation	Checklist / Primary
Splice or junction box behind an outside reader	Tech Spec 8.C.2 (v1.4 text): wiring accessible only from inside	Reader over a dedicated penetration	Primary
Outside reader without tamper protection	FFC C.1; Tech Spec 8.C.1 (v1.4 text)	Tamper-protected, securely fastened, tamper wired	Checklist / Primary
Uncleared vendor technicians with admin or remote access	FFC C.1 limits ID data, PINs and codes to SCI-indoctrinated personnel	Cleared administrators; escorted, logged service	Checklist
Assuming a GSA FIPS 201 APL listing makes a PACS "SCIF-approved"	APL compliance is separate from Tech Spec and AO requirements	Map features to the Tech Spec; get AO acceptance	Practitioner
Calling a reader protocol "FIPS AES certified" without a certificate	Certification is product-specific	Obtain CMVP certificate numbers	Practitioner

See: Access Control, Identity & Hirsch.

Sources Fixed Facility Checklist v1.5 · UFC 4-010-05 · ICS 705-1 · IC Tech Spec, Ch. 5–end (v1.4 archive; text source) · NIST FIPS 140-3 transition

15.09

RED/BLACK and filter traps

The CTTA decides countermeasures. Installers fail by improvising, and electricians get hurt by assuming filters behave like panels.

Trap	Why it fails	Fix	Source type
Self-specifying countermeasures, or marketing a room as "TEMPEST compliant"	The CTTA recommends countermeasures; exceeding a standard needs a waiver	Build to the CTTA's review	Primary
Adding RF shielding after drywall	ICS 705-1: plan it "during initial construction"	Submit the TEMPEST addendum in planning	Primary
Filter line and load sides reversed	Unfiltered conductors inside the shield	Dirty side outside, clean side inside	Practitioner
Dirty and clean wiring in one box or raceway	RF couples around the filter	Separate input and output wiring	Practitioner
Painted or loosely bonded filter case	Filter can't shunt RF to the case	Paint-free metal-to-metal bond	Practitioner
GFCI ahead of a TEMPEST filter	Filter leakage current trips it	Placement per EE and AHJ	Practitioner
Generator trouble after filters are added	Filter kVAR; low-kVAR filters exist	EE reviews filters with generator and UPS	Practitioner
Touching a de-energized filter	Stored charge	Lockout, wait, verify, discharge per manufacturer	Practitioner
RED and BLACK cables bundled, or sharing tray or patch panel	Coupling onto BLACK lines that leave	Separate labeled pathways per drawings and CTTA; never guess separation	Practitioner
Separate unbonded "clean" earth rod	Safety and code problem	One bonded electrode system per EE and AHJ	Practitioner
Assuming a RED/BLACK design guarantees a TEMPEST pass	Historical MIL-HDBK-232A says deficiencies may remain and testing may add measures	Budget for post-installation findings	Primary
Posting TEMPEST details, drawings or checklists	UFC 1-16.3: at least CONFIDENTIAL when tied to a location	Controlled channels only	UFC

See: RED/BLACK, TEMPEST & EMI Filters.

Sources Premier: filter installation best practices (practitioner) · Premier: filters and generator startup (practitioner) · ETS-Lindgren EMI/EMP filter manual · ICS 705-1 · UFC 4-010-05 · MIL-HDBK-232A §4 (historical mirror) · Holland Shielding: 101 EMI shielding tips

15.10

Shielding and installer damage traps

Shields rarely fail from bad design. They fail from a trade that didn't know the wall was a shield.

Trap	Why it fails	Fix	Source type
Outer drywall screws driven through architectural foil	Screws penetrate the shielding and create leakage	Furring or the vendor's fastening detail	Practitioner
Hanger rods and angles through a shielded ceiling	"hundreds, if not thousands, of penetrations"	Hang from structure per shield detail	Practitioner
Self-tapping screws or unsealed bolts in a steel shield	UFGS 13 49 20.00 10 prohibits self-tapping screws and requires welded seals	Shield vendor attaches and seals	Primary
Field-drilling an RF frame for a concealed contact	Concealed switches need a drilled hole and wiring inside the frame	Surface switch on the protected side, or factory-prepared frame	Practitioner (manufacturer)
Adhesive-mounting a UL 634 Level II switch	Not a documented method; defeats the removal tamper design	Screw to bracket, spacer or strut	Practitioner (manufacturer)
Strut or conduit touching the shield; clamp-on bonds	Unplanned ground paths; Historical MIL-HDBK-1195 says clamped joints lose continuity	Isolate; bond only where detailed	Practitioner
Copper, PoE, armored fiber or steel fish tape in a waveguide	Metal in the tube forms a coaxial path with no cutoff	All-dielectric fiber; non-metallic pull string	Practitioner
Weld spatter or paint on finger stock	Historical MIL-HDBK-1195: damaged or dirty fingers reduce shielding	Cover contacts; mask before painting	Practitioner
Hardware holding the RF door off its seal	Fails RF and acoustic tests	Check closure after each hardware install	Practitioner
Shield test before doors and hardware are in	The test describes a different room	Test after all penetrations, doors and hardware	Practitioner
Caulking over a shield hole	Hides the leak without restoring conductivity	Stop, report, vendor repair, retest	Practitioner
Spare conduit on an RF shield closed with acoustic fill only	Tech Spec 3.G.6 closure is acoustic	RF closure per shield vendor, covered by the test	Practitioner

See: RF Shielding, Penetrations & Installer Methods.

Sources In Compliance: SCIF and RF secured facility design, part 2 (practitioner) · UFGS 13 49 20.00 10 · Magnasphere HSS L2C installation instructions · Magnasphere HSS L2C removal tamper · MIL-HDBK-1195 §2.6 (historical mirror) · MIL-HDBK-1195 §2.6.2 (historical mirror) · Holland Shielding: 101 EMI shielding tips

15.11

PED, telecom and CCTV traps

Anything that can transmit, record or carry audio across the perimeter needs a decision before it's installed.

Trap	Why it fails	Fix	Source type
Cameras inside the perimeter, or able to view in	UFC 3-4.17.2: "Cameras are not allowed within the perimeter or enable observation within the perimeter"	Exterior camera at the primary entrance only	UFC
Entrance camera that sees keypad entry, the dial or through the open door	Exposes PINs and the interior	Aim at the approach; privacy masking only as backup	Practitioner
IP cameras or video intercoms with microphones near SCIF walls	Audio pickup at the perimeter	No-audio models, or microphones physically disabled	Practitioner
Wireless locks, BLE readers, wireless sensors or cellular communicators inside	ICS 705-1 G.2.a: no RF transmitters without evaluation and AO approval	Wired devices; submit any transmitter for review	Primary
Wi-Fi access points, DAS antennas or boosters on the outside face of SCIF walls	The TEMPEST Checklist asks about transmitters near the perimeter	Coordinate building RF layouts with the AO and CTTA	Checklist
Notification speakers wired straight from the building panel	Checklist asks for "fiber isolation, self-amplified speakers, other method to ensure no audio back feed"	Isolation designed with the AHJ and AO	Checklist
Ordinary desk phones or speakerphones	FFC F.1–F.2: CNSSI 5006 (TSG-6) instruments or disconnects	Approved instruments; microphones AO-approved	Checklist
Telephone system that can force or hold a station off-hook	Flagged in FFC F.1.c	CNSSI 5002-configured system	Checklist
Cable TV brought in undeclared	FFC F.5 requires an annotated floor plan	Declare it	Checklist
PED lockers recessed in the perimeter or near NSI processing	UFC 3-4.7	Lockers outside the primary entrance, placed per UFC	UFC
Promising RF detection catches every phone	Powered-off devices are invisible; standby phones transmit rarely	Pair detection with policy, lockers and screening	Practitioner
Reading the 30 Jun 2023 SECDEF memo as "installed by 2024"	It says components "program for" detection systems by 30 Sep 2024	Quote it accurately	Primary

Sources UFC 4-010-05 · Fixed Facility Checklist v1.5 · TEMPEST Checklist v1.4 · ICS 705-1 · SECDEF memo, 30 Jun 2023 · BVS Wolfhound-Ultra (vendor) · Bastille: wireless security for classified areas (vendor)

15.12

Life safety and AHJ conflict traps

The AHJ and the AO both have jurisdiction over SCIF doors. Conflicts found at final inspection mean replacing hardware.

Trap	Why it fails	Fix	Source type
AHJ first sees SCIF door hardware at final inspection	DoD Lock Program: "check with your local fire marshal (Authority Having Jurisdiction – AHJ) prior to procurement"	Review the door schedule with the AHJ in design	Primary
Delayed egress specified without code review	UFC 3-4.6.10 recommends it only "with NFPA 101 compliance"	Confirm occupancy, sprinklers, alarm release and signage	UFC
Interlocked vestibule without AHJ approval	Interlocks "are not currently addressed in the model codes"	AHJ approval; release on fire alarm and power loss	Practitioner
Fail-secure hardware with no mechanical free egress inside	Traps occupants	FF-L-2890 lever or panic device for egress	Primary / Practitioner
Non-panic device where occupancy needs panic hardware	FF-L-2890C Types III, IV, VIII and X have fire-rated panic hardware	Choose the type by occupancy	Primary
STC door on a rated corridor without a fire label	The assembly needs both ratings	Specify a fire-labeled acoustic assembly	Practitioner
Missing firestop at rated penetrations	UFC 3-4.11.3	Listed firestop that also seals acoustically	UFC
Non-listed non-metallic sections in sprinkler pipe	Must be listed and firestopped	Fire protection engineer and AHJ approve fittings	Practitioner
RF door threshold that blocks accessibility	UFC Figure 3-16 is titled "ABA Non-Compliant RF Door"	Resolve thresholds and clearances in design	UFC
Egress from a lower security area through a higher one	UFC 3-3.3.2 prohibits it	Nest areas so egress never crosses higher space	UFC
Assuming grandfathered status exempts doors from life-safety code	Life-safety code still applies to egress doors	Upgrade egress hardware as code requires	Practitioner
Building fire panels placed inside the SCIF	UFC 3-3.3.2: building support spaces "should remain outside"	Panels outside; field devices inside per CTTA review	UFC / Practitioner

See: Penetrations, Utilities & Life Safety.

Sources DoD Lock Program: pedestrian door deadbolt devices · FF-L-2890C · UFC 4-010-05 · I Dig Hardware: interlocks and delayed egress (practitioner) · I Dig Hardware: SCIF security and egress (practitioner) · O'Haver: SCIF door tutorial and grandfathering (practitioner)

15.13

Naming and version traps

Wrong names end up in specifications, submittals and proposals, and they signal inexperience to reviewers.

Trap	Why it fails	Fix	Source type
"The 2020 Tech Spec" or "Tech Spec 1.5"	v1.5 is dated 13 Mar 2020. The current public version is v1.5.1 (26 Jul 2021), which added Chapter 13 and moved forms to Chapter 14	Cite v1.5.1 and its chapter numbers	Primary
"DoDM 5205.07 Volume 3 governs SAPFs"	The consolidated DoDM 5205.07, effective 17 Jan 2025, cancelled Volume 3	Cite DoDM 5205.07 (2025)	Primary
Reading "SSM" as the day-to-day SCIF security manager	In ICS 705-1 and the Tech Spec, SSM is the Site Security Manager for planning, design and construction	Route operations questions to the SSO, SSR or CSSO	Primary
"NISPOM closed area"	32 CFR Part 117 replaced "closed areas" with open storage areas; UL's form still says "closed area"	Say "open storage area"	Primary
Mercantile Extent 3 treated as UL 2050 Extent 3	UL 681 mercantile certificates use the same number	UL 2050 NISS certificate	Primary
Glossaries where Extent 5 means "complete coverage"	32 CFR 117.15(d)(4) treats Extent 5 as reduced and patrol-based, needing CSA approval	Ignore those scales	Primary
Calling FF-L-2937 a padlock, or using it for classified	FF-L-2937 is a mechanical combination lock for AA&E; the padlock specs are FF-P-110J and MIL-DTL-43607	FF-L-2740B for classified	Primary
Specifying the LKM7000 as current	Not on QPL-FF-L-2890-5, which lists the LKM10K; treat as legacy (current status unverified)	Check the current QPL	Primary
Specifying FIPS 140-2-only modules for new work	140-2 validations move to the CMVP Historical List on 21 Sep 2026	Prefer FIPS 140-3; AO decides on 140-2	Primary
Calling IEEE 299-2006 simply "current"	IEEE lists it Inactive-Reserved (30 Mar 2023); revision P299 is in development	Contract names the method, edition and pass levels	Primary
"DCSA will accredit our SCIF"	DCSA doesn't accredit SCIFs; DIA accredits most DoD SCIFs, and NSA, NGA and NRO their own	Identify the SCI AO early	Primary

Sources IC Tech Spec v1.5.1 · DoDM 5205.07 (2025) · ICS 705-1 · DCSA Form 147 guide · 32 CFR 117.15 · UL mercantile demo certificate · QPL-FF-L-2890-5 · FF-L-2937 · NIST FIPS 140-3 transition · IEEE 299-2006 · IEEE P299 · DoDM 5105.21 Vol. 1