Module 06 · 16 sections

Doors, Locks & Security Containers

SCIF door types and fabrication, FF-L-2740B and FF-L-2890C hardware, UL 1034 strikes, STC doors, GSA containers, vault doors and SF 700/701/702.

On this page
  1. 06.01The three SCIF perimeter door categories
  2. 06.02Requirements for every perimeter door
  3. 06.03Door fabrication requirements
  4. 06.04Roll-up, double-leaf and adjoining-SCIF doors
  5. 06.05FF-L-2740B combination locks and approved models
  6. 06.06FF-L-2890C pedestrian door device types
  7. 06.07Approved FF-L-2890 products and the revision question
  8. 06.08Electrified hardware: UL 1034 fail-secure strikes and the FF-L-2740 lock
  9. 06.09STC-rated door assemblies
  10. 06.10GSA-approved security containers: Class 5 and Class 6
  11. 06.11Black-label container phase-out timeline
  12. 06.12GSA vault doors under AA-D-600D
  13. 06.13The DoD Lock Program and technical support hotline
  14. 06.14Combination changes under 32 CFR 2001.43
  15. 06.15SF 700, SF 701 and SF 702
  16. 06.16Common door, lock and container failures
06.01

The three SCIF perimeter door categories

Tech Spec v1.5.1 §3.E.1 sorts every SCIF perimeter door into one of three categories. The category decides the locking hardware, whether access control is allowed, and how the door is alarmed.

Category Tech Spec definition Locking hardware (3.E.2–3.E.4) Access control and alarm
Primary door "A SCIF perimeter door recognized as the main entrance." GSA-approved pedestrian door deadbolt meeting the most current FF-L-2890 (or previously AO-approved FF-L-2740 installations) plus a combination lock meeting the most current FF-L-2740 "An approved access control device (see Chapter 8). May be equipped with a by-pass keyway for use in the event of an access control system failure."
Secondary door "A SCIF perimeter door employed as both an entry and egress door that is not the Primary door." Established with AO approval per building code, safety and accessibility requirements. GSA-approved egress device with deadbolt per FF-L-2890 for secondary door use (or AO-approved equivalent). No additional standalone or flush-mounted deadbolts. ACS hardware per Ch. 8. "The access control system must be deactivated when the SCIF is not occupied."
Emergency egress-only door "A SCIF perimeter door employed as an emergency egress door with no entry capability." GSA-approved emergency egress device with deadbolt per FF-L-2890 for exit-only use. No exterior hardware. No additional standalone deadbolts. Alarmed 24/7 with a local audible annunciator that sounds when the door is opened.

How many of each:

  • Primary: one per SCIF. UFC 4-010-05 §3-4.6.7: "Unless approved by the AO, provide one primary entrance where visitor control is conducted."
  • Secondary: only with AO authorization.
  • Emergency egress-only: as required by the building code and the Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ).

Sources IC Tech Spec v1.5.1 · UFC 4-010-05 · FF-L-2890C

06.02

Requirements for every perimeter door

Regardless of category, Tech Spec §3.E.5 and UFC 4-010-05 §3-4.6 apply the same baseline to every SCIF perimeter door.

Requirement Source and detail
Life safety and accessibility Comply with applicable building code, life safety and accessibility requirements as determined by the AHJ (Tech Spec 3.E.5)
End of day SOPs ensure all doors are secured at the end of the day
Door closer Automatic, non-hold door closer on the SCIF side; UFC 3-4.6.4: "heavy-duty automatic non-hold door-closer installed internal to the perimeter"
Hinge pins Pins accessible from outside secured against removal (for example welded, set screws, dog bolts); UFC 3-4.6.6.1: "Hinge pins on perimeter doors must be tamper resistant unless mounted on the protected side"
Acoustics Meet Chapter 9 acoustic requirements unless the area is declared a non-discussion area (UFC adds "and protected by IDS")
Alarm Alarmed per Chapter 7: each perimeter door protected by a UL 634 High Security Switch meeting Level II and a motion sensor (Tech Spec 7.A.2.d, 7.A.3.a(7))
TEMPEST Meet TEMPEST requirements per CTTA guidance
Vestibule Recommended "to preclude visual observation and enhance acoustic protection" (Tech Spec 3.E.5; UFC 3-4.6.9)
Glass "All perimeter doors must be solid with no lites or sidelites" (UFC 3-4.6)

Two points installers often miss:

  1. Non-hold means non-hold. Closers with hold-open arms, magnetic hold-opens, or wedges defeat the requirement.
  2. Emergency egress doors are alarmed even when the IDS is disarmed. The door contact on an egress-only door stays active 24/7 (Tech Spec 3.E.4; 7.B.2).

See: Intrusion Detection & UL 2050 / Extent 3 · See: Penetrations, Utilities & Life Safety

Sources IC Tech Spec v1.5.1 · UFC 4-010-05 · SCIF Fixed Facility Checklist v1.5

06.03

Door fabrication requirements

A SCIF perimeter door is a reinforced pedestrian door, not a vault door. Tech Spec §3.E.6 and UFC 4-010-05 §3-4.6.1–3-4.6.6 set the construction.

Item Requirement
Wood door "1 3/4 inch-thick solid wood core (i.e. wood stave, structural composite lumber)"; lock area predrilled
Steel door "1 3/4 inch-thick face steel equal to minimum 18-gauge steel"
Hinge reinforcement Reinforced to 7-gauge steel, "preferably a lift hinge" (Tech Spec); UFC: minimum 7-gauge "and be cam-lift for acoustical door assemblies"
Closer reinforcement 12-gauge steel
Lock area "predrilled and/or reinforced to 10-gauge steel"
Acoustic rating (DoD) Door assemblies factory tested per ASTM E90 to no less than STC 50 when an STC 45 perimeter is required, and no less than STC 55 when an STC 50 perimeter is required (UFC 3-4.6.1, 3-4.3.3)
Structural support Coordinate with the structural engineer; install per UFGS 08 34 73 (UFC)

Why the reinforcement matters:

  • The lock extension, combination lock, closer and hinges all mount through the door and frame, and the strike must resist attack from outside. FF-L-2890C requires the strike to withstand 600 lbf from the outside.
  • Cam-lift hinges raise the door as it opens so drop seals and thresholds are not dragged, which keeps acoustic seals working.

Sources IC Tech Spec v1.5.1 · UFC 4-010-05 · FF-L-2890C · O'Haver: SCIF door tutorial (practitioner)

06.04

Roll-up, double-leaf and adjoining-SCIF doors

Some openings do not fit the single pedestrian door model. The Tech Spec addresses three common cases in §3.E.6.

Door type Requirement
Roll-up door Minimum 18-gauge steel; secured inside the SCIF with deadbolts on both sides; alarmed
Double doors Fixed (inactive) leaf secured top and bottom with deadbolts; an astragal attached to one door; each leaf has its own alarm contact
Doors between adjoining SCIFs Deadbolted and alarmed on both sides; acoustic treatment as needed; covered by AO-approved SOP

Design notes for each:

  • Roll-up doors are usually loading or equipment openings. They count as perimeter doors, so they also need acoustic treatment if the space is a discussion area, and they need IDS coverage like any other door.
  • Double doors have two failure points: the inactive leaf and the meeting edge. An alarm contact on only the active leaf leaves the inactive leaf unmonitored. The astragal closes the gap at the meeting edge for both physical and acoustic reasons.
  • Adjoining SCIFs each keep their own perimeter. The shared door must be secured and alarmed from both sides, and the SOP must say who controls it.

A vestibule at the primary entrance is recommended for every SCIF. UFC 4-010-05 §2-8 programs vestibule space at the primary entrance, and §3-4.6.9 describes it. A vestibule also gives the design team a place to put a vault door's day-access control, because a vault door cannot be the day-access door (Tech Spec 3.E.6).

Sources IC Tech Spec v1.5.1 · UFC 4-010-05

06.05

FF-L-2740B combination locks and approved models

FF-L-2740B, Locks, Combination, Electromechanical (15 Jun 2011, superseding FF-L-2740A of 1997), is the lock that protects unattended national security information on GSA containers, vault doors and SCIF pedestrian door deadbolts.

What the specification demands.

Attribute Requirement
Surreptitious entry resistance (manipulation, radiological, emanations analysis) 20 man-hours
Covert entry resistance 30 man-minutes
Combinations At least 1,000,000
Style 1 Self-contained, no external data port, self-generating power
Style 2 External communication and replaceable power allowed, but communications "shall not be able to open" the lock
Tamper Bolt lockout if the cover is disturbed

Sales are restricted to the government and authorized contractors. Every currently approved FF-L-2740B lock is an electromechanical dial lock: you still turn a dial, and electronics handle the combination.

Approved models (DoD Lock Program).

Model Status
Kaba Mas X-10 Current. Self-powered by turning the dial; approved under FF-L-2740B on 9 Apr 2013 (Style 1)
Sargent & Greenleaf 2740B Current. Battery powered; approved Nov 2013 (Style 2)
Kaba Mas X-07, X-08 Approved for existing installations; DoD Lock Program says they have reached end of expected service life and recommends replacement
Kaba Mas X-09 Approved for existing installations; no longer manufactured, no parts
S&G 2740 (FF-L-2740A) Documented for support only; discontinued

Mechanical Group 1 and 1R safe locks do not meet FF-L-2740. Retired FF-L-2740 locks go back to the DoD Lock Program, not into normal waste streams.

Sources FF-L-2740B · DoD Lock Program: Combination Locks · Kaba Mas X-10 · S&G 2740B · CDSE: DoD-approved locks job aid

06.06

FF-L-2890C pedestrian door device types

FF-L-2890C, Lock Extensions (Pedestrian Door Lock Assembly Preassembled, Panic and Auxiliary Deadbolt) (22 Feb 2019, superseding FF-L-2890B of 17 Apr 2012), defines ten device types. Pick the type from the door category, the swing, whether panic hardware is required, and whether the door ties into an access control system.

Type Door application Trim Access control FF-L-2740B lock
I Primary, any swing Lever Stand-alone keypad Yes
II Primary, any swing Lever Integrated with building ACS (fail-secure electric release) Yes
III Primary, outswing Panic bar Stand-alone keypad Yes
IV Primary, outswing Panic bar Integrated with building ACS Yes
V Room not regularly occupied Lever Keyed reset Yes
VI Room not regularly occupied Escape knob None Yes
VII Secondary, any swing Lever Integrated with building ACS No
VIII Secondary, any swing Panic bar Integrated with building ACS No
IX Exit-only, any swing Lever None No
X Exit-only, outswing Panic bar None No

Key features built into the specification:

  • Life safety: compliance with UFAS, ADA, IBC, NFPA 80 and NFPA 101; one-hand operation that "should not require tight grasping, tight pinching, or twisting of the wrist"; listed for fire door use (UL 10C / UL 10B / NFPA 252).
  • Life safety by type: per the DoD Lock Program, Types I–IV and VII–X meet life safety requirements. All types are field-handed.
  • Stand-alone keypads: Types I and III have an integrated keypad with at least a 4-digit code.
  • Electric strikes: any electric strike used "must be UL-1034 listed."
  • Security: 20 man-hours surreptitious entry resistance; strike withstands 600 lbf from outside.

See: Penetrations, Utilities & Life Safety

Sources FF-L-2890C · DoD Lock Program: Pedestrian Door Deadbolt Devices · I Dig Hardware: SCIF security and egress (practitioner)

06.07

Approved FF-L-2890 products and the revision question

Only products on the Qualified Products List may be used as FF-L-2890 lock extensions. The DoD Lock Program posts the current list.

QPL-FF-L-2890-5 (21 Mar 2022).

Manufacturer and series Types listed
Kaba Mas CDX-10 Type VI
Lockmasters LKM10K series Types I–IV, VII, IX–X
Sargent & Greenleaf 2890 series Types I–X

The DoD Lock Program also documents the older CDX-07, CDX-08 and CDX-09 devices. It notes CDX-07/08 have reached end of expected service life and CDX-09 is no longer manufactured. The CDX series is noted for rooms without regular occupancy.

Procurement rules of thumb.

  1. Check with the AHJ before you buy. The DoD Lock Program tells buyers to "check with your local fire marshal (Authority Having Jurisdiction – AHJ) prior to procurement." Panic hardware, delayed egress and fire-rated openings are AHJ decisions.
  2. Match the type to the door category. Primary doors use Types I–IV. Secondary doors use Types VII–VIII. Exit-only doors use Types IX–X.
  3. Order the door prep with the device. The door and frame fabricator needs the device template and reinforcement locations.
  4. Record the device type on the door schedule so the fabricator, installer and inspector are working from the same information.

Sources QPL-FF-L-2890-5 · DoD Lock Program: Pedestrian Door Deadbolt Devices · DoD Lock Program: CDX Series · I Dig Hardware (practitioner)

06.08

Electrified hardware: UL 1034 fail-secure strikes and the FF-L-2740 lock

Access control and the combination lock do different jobs on the same door. The electric strike or electrified trim controls the latch during duty hours. The FF-L-2740 lock throws the deadbolt that secures the SCIF when it is empty.

The rules.

  • ICS 705-1 §G.2.b: approved entry control methods include "automated access control systems using at least two technologies (badge, PIN, biometric, etc.)," and these methods are not approved for securing SCIF entrances when the SCIF is unoccupied.
  • UFC 4-010-05 §3-4.6.5: "Electric door strikes or electrified mortise locks installed with an access control system (ACS) must have a positive engagement, fail secure, and approved under UL 1034 for burglar resistance."
  • FF-L-2890C: Types II, IV, VII and VIII provide "fail secure, electric release capability for use with existing automated building access control systems," with UL 1034 listed strikes. Once the combination-lock bolt is extended, it cannot be unlocked from outside without dialing the combination again.
  • Bypass keyway: any exterior key bypass is for ACS failure only, and removing the bypass cylinder must not give access to the primary lock mechanism.
  • Tech Spec 3.E.3: secondary door ACS "must be deactivated when the SCIF is not occupied."

How the door operates.

SCIF state Primary door Secondary door Egress-only door
Occupied ACS (two technologies) or personal recognition controls the latch ACS controls the latch Alarmed 24/7; no entry
Unoccupied FF-L-2740 lock throws the FF-L-2890 deadbolt; IDS armed ACS deactivated; deadbolt secured Alarmed 24/7; no entry

Free egress stays mechanical from the inside through the FF-L-2890 lever or panic device, so a fail-secure strike does not trap occupants.

See: Access Control, Identity & Hirsch

Sources ICS 705-1 · UFC 4-010-05 · FF-L-2890C · IC Tech Spec v1.5.1

06.09

STC-rated door assemblies

A door is usually the weakest acoustic element in a SCIF wall. The fix is a tested door assembly, not a heavy door with seals added later.

What "assembly" means.

The door leaf, frame, perimeter seals, threshold and automatic drop seal are tested together as one unit to ASTM E90. The published STC applies only to that combination, installed the way it was tested.

DoD ratings (UFC 4-010-05).

Perimeter target Door assembly lab rating
Sound Group 3 (STC 45 perimeter) Factory tested per ASTM E90 to no less than STC 50 (UFC 3-4.6.1)
Sound Group 4 (STC 50 perimeter) No less than STC 55 (UFC 3-4.3.3)

The 5-point margin exists because field performance is almost always lower than the lab rating. Gaps at the head and jambs, a threshold that is not level, and a closer that does not pull the door fully shut all reduce performance.

Installation details that decide the result.

  • Cam-lift hinges for acoustic door assemblies (UFC 3-4.6.6) keep drop seals from dragging.
  • Fire labels: an acoustic door on a rated corridor must also carry the fire label for that opening.
  • Hardware compatibility: seals, the FF-L-2890 deadbolt and the High Security Switch all compete for the same few millimeters at the door edge. Practitioners report that some seal types can cause deadbolt binding. Mock up the seal and hardware combination before ordering in quantity.
  • Vestibule: a vestibule adds a second door and is recommended "to enhance acoustic protection" (Tech Spec 3.E.5).

See: Acoustics & Sound Masking

Sources UFC 4-010-05 · IC Tech Spec v1.5.1 · ASTM E90 · PSC: acoustic requirements (practitioner) · O'Haver: SCIF door tutorial (practitioner)

06.10

GSA-approved security containers: Class 5 and Class 6

In a closed storage SCIF, SCI lives in GSA-approved security containers. The container, not the room, is the storage protection. The DoD Lock Program lists the current classes.

Class Federal specification(s) Forced entry Covert entry Surreptitious entry Use
Class 5 AA-F-358K, AA-F-363D, AA-C-2786A 10 min 30 min 20 hr Classified material, weapons, sensitive items
Class 5-W AA-F-358K, AA-C-2859A 10 min Weapons only
Class 6 AA-F-358K, AA-F-363D None 30 min 20 hr Classified information
Class 6-S AA-F-358K None 30 min 20 hr Aboard DoD ships
Classes 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 Discontinued

Reading the label.

Label Meaning
Black label (silver with black letters) Pre-1990 manufacture; cannot be recertified
Red label (silver with red letters) Can be recertified by GSA-certified inspectors after neutralization per FED-STD-809
Blue label Information Processing System (IPS) containers

Where containers fit in the rules.

  • 32 CFR 2001.43 sets supplemental controls for Top Secret in a GSA container, such as IDS with a 15-minute response, or Security-in-Depth with a container equipped with an FF-L-2740 lock.
  • Class 5-W is weapons-only and is not a classified storage container.
  • Containers need an SF 700 and an SF 702 (see the forms section below).

Sources DoD Lock Program: GSA Approved Security Containers · 32 CFR 2001.43 · CDSE: Classified storage short (IFS0078)

06.11

Black-label container phase-out timeline

Older GSA containers made before 1990 carry a black label. Their approval for classified storage is being withdrawn in stages.

Date What happens Source
Pre-1990 Black-label containers manufactured; they cannot be recertified DoD Lock Program
2021 ISOO Notice 2021-01 rescinds approval of pre-1989 GSA safes; GSA/IACSE briefs the phase-out to NISPPAC ISOO; NISPPAC briefing
1 Oct 2024 Black-label Class 1–4 cabinets become obsolete NISPPAC briefing (2021)
1 Oct 2028 Black-label Class 5 and Class 6 containers follow NISPPAC briefing (2021)

What facility owners should do now.

  1. Survey every container: class, label color, manufacturer, and serial number.
  2. Flag black-label units, especially Class 5 and 6 units still in classified service.
  3. Plan replacement with the accrediting authority and budget for it before the 2028 date.
  4. Ask the DoD Lock Program about removal and disposal. Retired FF-L-2740 locks go back to the program rather than normal waste streams.
  5. Update records. SF 700 information and container inventories must reflect replacements.

Sources NISPPAC black-label phase-out briefing (2021) · ISOO Notice 2021-01 · DoD Lock Program: GSA Approved Security Containers

06.12

GSA vault doors under AA-D-600D

Vault doors are covered by Federal Specification AA-D-600D. They belong on vaults and some open storage rooms, not on standard SCIF entrances.

Class Lock Forced Covert Surreptitious Notes
5-A (Armory) FF-L-2937 (mechanical) 10 min 30 min Arms, ammunition and explosives only; not for classified
5-B (Ballistic) FF-L-2740B 10 min 30 min 20 hr Ballistic resistant
5-V (Security) FF-L-2740B 10 min 30 min 20 hr For national security information
Class 6 (AA-D-600C) FF-L-2740 30 min 20 hr Superseded; no longer current
Class 8 (AA-D-2757) FF-L-2740 15 min 30 min 20 hr Canceled; existing doors may be encountered

How vault doors relate to SCIF construction.

  • A SCIF perimeter door is not a vault door. It is a 1 3/4 in. solid wood or 18-gauge steel pedestrian door with FF-L-2890 and FF-L-2740 hardware (Tech Spec 3.E).
  • Tech Spec 3.C.5: "All vaults shall be equipped with a GSA-approved Class 5 vault door."
  • Tech Spec 3.E.6: a vault door cannot serve as day-access control. A vestibule with an access control device may be built in front of it.
  • UFC 4-010-05 §3-4.6.11: specify a GSA-approved Class 5 vault door "equipped to meet Architectural Barriers Act (ABA) Standards."

See: Perimeter Construction & Vaults

Sources DoD Lock Program: GSA Approved Vault Doors · AA-D-600D · IC Tech Spec v1.5.1 · UFC 4-010-05 · FF-L-2937

06.13

The DoD Lock Program and technical support hotline

The DoD Lock Program is run by the NAVFAC Engineering and Expeditionary Warfare Center (EXWC). It describes itself as the "DoD technical authority for locks, safes, vaults, seals, and containers used to protect national security information (NSI) and arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E)." Some of its pages now use "DoW Lock Program" naming; it is the same program.

How to reach it.

Channel Detail
Technical Support Hotline (800) 290-7607 or (805) 982-1212
Email DOD_Lock_Program_Support@us.navy.mil
Hours 0500–1700 Pacific, Monday–Friday

What it provides.

  • Hardware selection help, specifications, National Stock Numbers, purchasing guidance and troubleshooting.
  • GSA-certified safe and vault technician training, and training on Kaba Mas and S&G 2740 locks.
  • Security Facts Newsletters.
  • Posted federal specifications and Qualified Products Lists (FF-L-2740B, FF-L-2890C, AA-D-600D, AA-V-2737 and others).
  • Mirror copies of ICD 705, ICS 705-1, ICS 705-2, the Tech Spec v1.5.1 and UFC 4-010-05.
  • Disposal instructions: retired FF-L-2740 locks go to the program rather than normal waste streams.

Sponsors listed by the program include NAVFAC, the US Army, DLA Land and Maritime, CIA, DNI, GSA and CNIC. Approvals of security equipment are managed through GSA's Interagency Advisory Committee on Security Equipment (IACSE) and its Security Equipment and Locking Systems (SEALS) subcommittee.

Sources DoD Lock Program · DoD Lock Program: Combination Locks · Security Facts Newsletter Issue 27

06.14

Combination changes under 32 CFR 2001.43

The combination is the only thing standing between an unoccupied SCIF and anyone who has learned it. Federal rules set when it must change.

32 CFR 2001.43(c) (ISOO implementing directive).

Combinations to dial-type locks are changed:

  1. When the equipment is first placed into use.
  2. When a person knowing the combination no longer requires access to it.
  3. When the combination may have been disclosed without authorization (compromise or suspected compromise).

Only persons with the appropriate clearance change combinations, unless other controls prevent access to the protected material.

How this plays out in a SCIF.

Event Action
New SCIF door or container delivered Change from the factory combination before use
Employee with the combination leaves or loses access Change the combination
Combination written down improperly, overheard, or found exposed Treat as possible compromise; change it and report per SOP
  • Tech Spec Ch. 12.H, "Control of Combinations," covers SCIF-specific rules for recording, storing and changing combinations.
  • Agency example: the Department of State limits combination changes to authorized personnel with SCI access and lock training (12 FAM 715.11(c)). Other agencies may differ.
  • Record the combination on the SF 700 per its instructions.

Sources 32 CFR 2001.43 · IC Tech Spec v1.5.1 · 12 FAM 710 · ISOO security forms

06.15

SF 700, SF 701 and SF 702

Three ISOO standard forms document who controls a locked door or container and whether it was checked. DoDM 5105.21 Volume 2 requires SF 701 for the end-of-day internal SCIF check and SF 702 for security checks of the SCIF door, vaults and containers.

Form Title What it records
SF 700 Security Container Information The container or door location and number, lock serial, and the people to contact if it is found open. The combination-record portion is sealed and kept separately.
SF 701 Activity Security Checklist End-of-day check of the work area (for example a SCIF) confirming classified material is secured, equipment is off, and windows and doors are locked
SF 702 Security Container Check Sheet Each open, close and checked by event, with initials and time, for vaults, secure rooms (including the SCIF door) and containers

Using the forms correctly.

  • SF 702 on unused days: mark "Not Opened," but still complete "Checked By."
  • SF 702 retention: per the component's records schedule. As one agency example, the Department of State keeps SF 702s 90 days after the last entry unless an incident occurred.
  • Which form where: the SF 701 covers the whole work area at close of business; an SF 702 is completed for each SCIF door, vault and container being opened, closed and checked.

Sources ISOO security forms · DoDM 5105.21 Vol. 2 · CDSE: Physical security short (PY001) · 12 FAM 710

06.16

Common door, lock and container failures

Practitioners report that door findings frequently delay SCIF inspections, and that most are hardware selection or installation errors.

Failure Requirement it breaks Basis
Deadlatch or non-QPL lock installed where an FF-L-2890 deadbolt is required Tech Spec 3.E.2–3.E.4 Primary + practitioner
Extra standalone or flush-mounted deadbolts on secondary or egress doors Tech Spec 3.E.3–3.E.4; UFC 3-4.6.8, 3-4.6.10 Primary
Exterior hardware on an egress-only door; door not alarmed 24/7 with local annunciator Tech Spec 3.E.4 Primary
Electric strike treated as the SCIF lock; fail-safe maglocks; non-UL 1034 strikes ICS 705-1 G.2.b; UFC 3-4.6.5 Primary
Secondary-door ACS left active after hours Tech Spec 3.E.3 Primary
Glass lites or sidelites in perimeter doors UFC 3-4.6 Primary
Exposed removable hinge pins; hold-open closers Tech Spec 3.E.5; UFC 3-4.6.4, 3-4.6.6.1 Primary
Door assembled from mixed components instead of a tested STC assembly UFC 3-4.6.1 Primary + practitioner
Frames not plumb, level and square; binding deadbolts; seal gaps Tech Spec 3.E; installation Practitioner
Double doors with one contact; inactive leaf not bolted top and bottom Tech Spec 3.E.6 Primary
Door contacts not UL 634 Level II HSS; no motion sensor covering the door Tech Spec 7.A.2.d, 7.A.3.a(7) Primary
FF-L-2937 mechanical lock, MIL-DTL-43607 key padlock, or Class 5-A vault door used for classified DoD Lock Program Primary
Black-label containers kept in service without a replacement plan NISPPAC phase-out Primary
Hardware bought before the AHJ reviewed egress, panic and fire-rating needs DoD Lock Program; FF-L-2890C Practitioner + primary
Factory combinations left in place; SF 702 check lines left blank 32 CFR 2001.43; DoDM 5105.21 V2 Primary

See: Traps & Common Failures

Sources IC Tech Spec v1.5.1 · UFC 4-010-05 · DoD Lock Program: High Security Padlocks · O'Haver: SCIF door tutorial (practitioner) · NISPPAC black-label phase-out