Accreditation, not construction

ICD 705 (26 May 2010) requires that SCI be handled only in accredited SCIFs, that SCIFs meet uniform Intelligence Community (IC) standards, and that they be built for reciprocal use across IC elements. Facilities must be accredited before SCI operations begin. DoD puts it bluntly: “SCI will not be discussed or introduced into the proposed SCIF until the facility is accredited” (DoDM 5105.21 Vol. 2).

Every SCIF also has a mode (closed storage, open storage or continuous operation) and may be a lesser type (SWA, TSWA, T-SCIF). Those choices drive walls, alarm response and cost (Chapter 5).

Where SAPFs fit

A Special Access Program Facility (SAPF) protects SAP information. Its current governing manual is the consolidated DoDM 5205.07 (17 Jan 2025), which cancelled the 2015 Volume 3 on physical security. A SAPF Accrediting Official, appointed in writing by the Cognizant Authority SAP Central Office, approves preconstruction plans and inspects and accredits the facility.

SAPFs are built to the equivalent Tech Spec criteria, and DCSA’s January 2026 SAP checklist cites Tech Spec Chapter 7 throughout for SAPF intrusion detection. A SAPF may be accredited as a SCIF after the AO reviews all required SCIF construction documentation (Tech Spec 1.B.2). Moving SAP into a SCIF, or SCI into a SAPF, requires a Co-Use Agreement first.

What a SCIF is not

• A NISPOM open storage area (formerly “closed area”): protects collateral classified information and is approved by DCSA. SCI cannot enter without SCI accreditation.
• A GSA-approved container: storage equipment, not a facility. A closed storage SCIF uses containers inside an accredited perimeter.
• A vault: a construction method (Tech Spec 3.C.5; FED-STD 832) that may sit inside or form part of a SCIF.
• A “SCIF-ready” modular product: the Tech Spec warns such claims “may not be accurate.”
• An RF-shielded room: shielding is one possible TEMPEST countermeasure a CTTA may recommend. It accredits nothing.

The Tech Spec, chapter by chapter

Chapter 1 Introduction · 2 Risk management (SID, compartmented areas) · 3 Fixed facility construction (inside the U.S.) · 4 Outside the U.S., not under Chief of Mission · 5 Under Chief of Mission · 6 Temporary, airborne, shipboard · 7 Intrusion detection · 8 Access control · 9 Acoustics · 10 PEDs · 11 Telecommunications · 12 Management & operations · 13 Second Party integree & liaison spaces (new in v1.5.1) · 14 Forms and plans.

The v1.5 and v1.5.1 change histories list no Chapter 7 (IDS) changes. Co-use sections N–P sit above the Chapter 13 heading in the v1.5.1 contents but belong to Chapter 12 (12.N–12.P).

Version traps that show up in specs and proposals

• “The 2020 Tech Spec.” That is v1.5 (cover date 13 Mar 2020). The current public version is v1.5.1, which moved Forms and Plans to Chapter 14.
• “DoDM 5205.07 Volume 3 governs SAPFs.” Volume 3 (23 Apr 2015) was cancelled by the consolidated manual effective 17 Jan 2025.
• “Extent 3 is in the Tech Spec.” Extent 3 is a UL 2050 installation designation; Tech Spec 7.A.2.b points to it.
• “DCSA will accredit our SCIF.” DCSA administers the NISP for collateral work. It does not accredit SCIFs or SAPFs.
• “NISPOM closed area.” 32 CFR Part 117 replaced closed areas with open storage areas. UL’s alarm form still says “closed area.”
• “Exceeding the standard is always safe.” Tech Spec 2.A: exceeding a standard, even based on risk, requires a waiver, and a waiver ends mandatory reciprocity.

Separation rules that invalidate approvals

• The AO does not grant waivers. ICD 705: “In no case may this official be the same person as the Accrediting Official.” Approved waivers are reported to the Director, NCSC within 30 days.
• The CTTA recommends; the AO approves. Integrators, shielding vendors and architects do not decide TEMPEST countermeasures.
• SSM means Site Security Manager in ICS 705-1 and the Tech Spec: planning, design and construction only. Operations belong to the SSO/SSR (government) or CSSO (contractor).
• DCSA does not accredit SCIFs. DIA provides physical and TEMPEST accreditation for DoD components and most DoD contractors; NSA, NGA and NRO accredit under their own cognizance.
• The GC cannot approve field changes to the perimeter. Deviations go through the SSM to the AO.
• The AO cannot waive a fire code. Life safety is the AHJ’s determination (Tech Spec 3.E.5), and neither office can waive the other’s requirements.
• A commercial bug sweep is not accreditation TSCM. TSCM for accreditation is requested through the AO and, as quoted in a practitioner summary (Armag) of Tech Spec 12.G.8, “will only be conducted by USG TSCM teams.”

Where a low-voltage integrator fits

The integrator’s work is some of the most heavily documented in the package, because the IDS is the detection layer when nobody is inside. What the public documents require of that scope:

• IDS installation, components and monitoring stations comply with UL 2050; installation is Extent 3 (Tech Spec 7.A.2.a–b).
• Contractor SCIFs “shall maintain a current UL certificate of installation and service,” renewed after IDS changes (ICS 705-1).
• Installation and testing inside the U.S. by U.S. companies using U.S. citizens (Tech Spec 7.D.1; UFC 1-18.1).
• System variables and passwords restricted to SCI-indoctrinated U.S. personnel (7.A.2.j); maintenance staff TOP SECRET-cleared or escorted, with repairs started within 4 hours of a trouble signal (7.C.2).
• The DoD package includes IDS specification sheets, the UL 2050 certificate, the NIST encryption certificate and IDS test results (DoDM 5105.21 Vol. 2).

An integrator does not accredit the space, approve the design, decide TEMPEST countermeasures or overrule life safety, and should never self-certify a room as “SCIF compliant.”

Plan: sponsor, concept, risk and TEMPEST

A SCIF exists to meet a government mission need, so every project needs a sponsor and an identified AO before design starts. For a DoD SCIF, the commander requests SCI from the Service CSA, designee or senior intelligence official, and “proof of sponsorship in the form of a SCIF number or written documentation of Concept Approval … is required” (UFC 4-010-05 2-2.1). SAPF sponsorship is generally formalized at the program level.

The AO and SSM assess “threats, vulnerabilities, and assets to determine the most efficient countermeasures” and document Security-in-Depth. The Pre-Construction Checklist (added in v1.5) gives the AO project data, points of contact and the “security in-depth starting point location.” If classified information will be processed electronically, the TEMPEST Checklist goes to the CTTA during planning, and the answer, the TEMPEST Countermeasures Review, may add filtering, dielectric breaks or shielding.

Design and approve: two gates before work

The AO must “review and approve the design concept, Construction Security Plan (CSP), and final design … prior to the start of SCIF construction” (Tech Spec 3.A). UFC 4-010-05 1-15 is blunt: “Do not award a construction contract without an approved CSP.” The CSP template’s baseline “may not be reduced without coordination and approval.”

Build and prove: the evidence trail

Inspectors cannot see inside finished walls, so the evidence is created now or never: SSM inspections for the duration of the project, violation notices to the AO within 3 business days, CST logs where required, and a photographic record of penetrations, door installations and wall assemblies (UFC 4-7). Systems testing produces the most paper: IDS acceptance tests (Tech Spec 7.D.3), the UL 2050 certificate, encryption certificates and acoustic results. The final FFC, SOP, emergency plan and (in DoD) catastrophic failure plan complete the package.

What the letter says, and what it does not

The letter of accreditation (ICS 705-2 §D.1.a) states the SCIF identity, type (for example open or closed storage), effective date, compliance with physical, TEMPEST and technical standards, and any waivers with the standard not met and when it will be. It enables SCI operations within that type and perimeter, reciprocal acceptance if there are no waivers, and co-use under a signed agreement. It does not authorize SAP, a different storage mode or a larger perimeter.

Operate: monitoring, re-evaluation, change

Continuous monitoring means SF 701 and SF 702 checks, random after-hours inspections at least monthly, posture changes reported to DIA’s accreditation office within 24 hours (DoD), and semiannual IDS tests with records kept two years. The CSA ensures periodic re-evaluations “or at least every five years” (ICS 705-2 §D.3.a). Re-accreditation is required for “major modifications to the SCIF, changes to the sensitivity of programs, or to the threat” (§D.4.b); in DoD that includes perimeter changes, storage-mode changes and leaving continuous operation.

Waivers, co-use and closeout

A waiver is limited to “exceptional circumstances” or a documented mission need to exceed a standard. The package states the standard affected, mitigations considered, justification, residual risk, compensating procedures, a compliance timeline and acceptance of lost mandatory reciprocity (ICS 705-1). DoD waivers normally last up to one year.

A Co-Use Agreement is signed by both parties’ AOs and is required for each contractor contracting effort; the tenant accepts the host accreditation and pays for changes it needs. Short-term exceptions: temporary SCI storage for another organization up to seven calendar days, and occasional conference-room use approved by the SSO. A SCIF de-accredited but held at SECRET for less than one year may be re-accredited (Tech Spec 1.B.1).

Choosing a mode

Closed storage allows the standard wall and a 15-minute response without relying on SID. The trade-off is operational: every classified item, including equipment and media, goes into a container at the end of the day. UFC 4-010-05 is explicit that closed storage “includes all classified materials, equipment and information.”

Open storage lets equipment, media and documents stay in place, which suits operations centers and heavy IT use. The cost is either a qualifying SID layer the AO accepts, or hardened walls plus a response force that can arrive in five minutes, which in practice often means an on-site guard force. In DoD, changing storage mode later requires re-accreditation.

SWAs suit briefing rooms and conference space next to an existing SCIF: when unoccupied, all SCI is removed to containers “within a SCIF, a vault, or be destroyed.” A TSWA is part-time and short-term; its extension “requires a plan to accredit as a SCIF or SWA.”

Security-in-Depth: the credit for what surrounds you

Tech Spec 2.B.1: “SID describes the factors that enhance the probability of detection before actual penetration to the SCIF occurs.” It “may alter construction requirements with AO approval” and can “extend security alarm response time to the maximum of 15 minutes.” At least one primary means is required (2.B.3):

1. A military installation, embassy compound, U.S. Government compound, or contractor compound with a dedicated U.S. response force.
2. A controlled building with separate building access controls, alarms and elevator controls.
3. Controlled office areas adjacent to or surrounding the SCIF, protected by alarm equipment.
4. A fenced compound with access-controlled vehicle and/or pedestrian gates.

SID is documented, not assumed: on FFC Section B (including external CCTV coverage maps), in the CSP’s SID block and on the Pre-Construction Checklist. SID is mandatory outside the U.S. (2.B.2) and “desired for all SCIF or SAPF” under UFC 4-010-05 1-12.

Three construction regimes

Chapter 3 covers SCIFs inside the U.S. Chapter 4 covers SCIFs outside the U.S. not under Chief of Mission authority: SID is mandatory, construction criteria follow threat Category, CSTs hold U.S. TOP SECRET clearances, and materials move under secure procurement, transport and storage. Chapter 5 covers Chief of Mission facilities, governed by ICDs and Overseas Security Policy Board standards in 12 FAH-6; the more stringent standard applies.

Category is set from the State Department’s Security Environment Threat List technical threat rating: Category I “Critical or High Technical Threat, High Vulnerability Buildings”; Category II “High Technical Threat, Low Vulnerability Buildings”; Category III “Low and Medium Technical Threat.” There is no Category IV, and open storage “is to be avoided” in Category I (and in Categories I and II under Chief of Mission).

What the perimeter must do

ICS 705-1 §G.1: the perimeter “shall provide a physical barrier to forced, covert and surreptitious entry,” with walls, floor and ceiling “permanently and solidly constructed and attached to each other,” providing “visual evidence of unauthorized penetration.” UFC 4-010-05 §3-3.2 adds that this “includes above the false ceilings and below raised floors.” A compliant perimeter does four jobs at once:

• Resist forced, covert and surreptitious entry (Tech Spec 3.C).
• Show visual evidence of any penetration: hard-finished, painted, inspectable surfaces.
• Contain speech to Sound Group 3 or 4 (Chapter 9).
• Provide TEMPEST/RF protection only when the CTTA recommends it (3.C.4).

True floor to true ceiling

Every perimeter wall runs from the structural slab to the underside of the deck above; a wall that stops at a suspended ceiling is not a perimeter wall. The Tech Spec wall figures require the “entire wall assembly” to be “finished and painted from true floor to true ceiling.” At the top and bottom that means:

1. 16-gauge continuous top and bottom track, anchors at 32 in. on center maximum, bedded in a continuous bead of acoustical sealant.
2. Remaining voids filled with fire-safe grout or acoustic sealant, including deck flutes.
3. The full height finished and painted, including the portion above any drop ceiling.

Existing walls, fire ratings and RF

An existing wall of substantial material (brick, concrete, block) equal to the perimeter standard may be used with AO approval (Tech Spec 3.C.1), but it still must run slab to slab and every old sleeve must be found and treated. The Tech Spec figures are security details, not listed fire-rated assemblies; UFC 4-010-05 §3-4.1 requires fire-retardant-treated plywood in noncombustible construction and tells designers to make Tech Spec details comply with the building code.

RF protection “shall be installed at the direction of the CTTA when a SCIF utilizes electronic processing and does not provide adequate RF attenuation at the inspectable space boundary” (3.C.4), typically foil-backed wallboard or an approved radiant-barrier foil. ICS 705-1 wants it planned “during initial construction” because retrofit costs far more.

Ceilings, floors and plenums

Floors and ceilings meet “the same standards for force protection and acoustic protection as walls,” with penetrations “kept to a minimum” (Tech Spec 3.D). A drop ceiling or raised floor is a finish, not the perimeter. If an above-ceiling or raised-floor plenum connects to non-SCIF space, the true perimeter has a hole in it; the AO may require plenum motion detection or other mitigation. Motion sensors “are not normally required above false ceilings or below false floors” in the U.S. (UFC 3-4.17.3).

Utilities on perimeter walls

On walls treated for acoustics or RF, interior distribution must be “surface mounted, contained in a raceway, or an additional wall” on furring stand-offs (Tech Spec 3.G.5). UFC 4-010-05 extends that to recessed outlet boxes and panels, and prohibits recessed fire extinguisher cabinets (§3-4.4.8) and recessed PED cabinets (§3-4.7) on perimeter walls.

Windows and the 18-foot rule

“Every effort should be made to minimize or eliminate windows in the SCIF, especially on the ground floor” (3.F.1). Windows are non-opening and provide visual and acoustic protection; RF treatment follows the CTTA. Windows within 18 ft of the ground or an accessible platform must meet the perimeter standard for forced entry and be alarmed per Chapter 7 (3.F.3, 3.F.5). UFC 4-010-05 §3-4.10 specifies visual protection by acid etching, sand blasting or an obscure PVB interlayer.

Every perimeter door

• Automatic, non-hold closer on the SCIF side; hinge pins accessible from outside secured against removal (3.E.5).
• Solid: “All perimeter doors must be solid with no lites or sidelites” (UFC 3-4.6).
• Alarmed with a UL 634 Level II High Security Switch and a motion sensor (7.A.2.d, 7.A.3.a(7)).
• Acoustic performance per Chapter 9 unless a declared non-discussion area; a vestibule is recommended “to preclude visual observation and enhance acoustic protection.”
• TEMPEST requirements per CTTA guidance; life safety and accessibility per the AHJ.

Fabrication

Wood: 1-3/4 in solid core. Steel: 1-3/4 in thick with faces equal to 18-gauge minimum. Hinges reinforced to 7-gauge (cam-lift for acoustic assemblies), closer to 12-gauge, lock area predrilled or reinforced to 10-gauge (Tech Spec 3.E.6; UFC 3-4.6.1–6). DoD door assemblies are factory-tested per ASTM E90 to at least STC 50 for an STC 45 perimeter, and STC 55 for STC 50. Roll-up doors are 18-gauge steel, deadbolted on both sides inside and alarmed; double doors need the fixed leaf bolted top and bottom, an astragal and a contact on each leaf.

The locks: FF-L-2740B and FF-L-2890C

FF-L-2740B electromechanical combination locks resist 20 man-hours of surreptitious entry and 30 man-minutes of covert entry, with at least 1,000,000 combinations; sales are restricted to the government and authorized contractors. Current approved models are the Kaba Mas X-10 (self-powered dial) and Sargent & Greenleaf 2740B. FF-L-2890C (22 Feb 2019) defines ten lock-extension types: primary doors use Types I–IV, rooms not regularly occupied V–VI, secondary doors VII–VIII, and exit-only doors IX–X. QPL-FF-L-2890-5 (21 Mar 2022) lists Kaba Mas CDX-10, the Lockmasters LKM10K series and the S&G 2890 series.

Electrified hardware: latch by day, deadbolt by night

ICS 705-1 approves automated access control “using at least two technologies” but not “for securing SCIF entrances when the SCIF is unoccupied.” UFC 3-4.6.5: electric strikes or electrified mortise locks “must have a positive engagement, fail secure, and approved under UL 1034 for burglar resistance.” FF-L-2890C Types II, IV, VII and VIII provide fail-secure electric release; once the combination-lock bolt is thrown it cannot be opened from outside without dialing again. Free egress stays mechanical from inside.

Containers, vault doors and the forms

In a closed storage SCIF the GSA-approved container is the storage protection. Current classes: Class 5 (10 min forced, 30 min covert, 20 hr surreptitious) and Class 6 (no forced-entry rating; 30 min covert, 20 hr surreptitious); 5-W is weapons-only and 6-S is for DoD ships. Black-label (pre-1990) containers cannot be recertified: black-label Class 1–4 cabinets became obsolete 1 Oct 2024, and Class 5 and 6 follow by 1 Oct 2028. Vault doors (AA-D-600D) use Class 5-V for national security information; the 5-A armory door and its FF-L-2937 lock are not for classified material.

Combinations change when first placed in use, when someone who knows it no longer needs access, and on possible compromise (32 CFR 2001.43(c)). SF 700 records container or door information; SF 701 is the end-of-day activity checklist; SF 702 logs every open, close and “checked by” event for the SCIF door, vaults and containers.

The general rules

• “All penetrations of perimeter walls shall be kept to a minimum” (Tech Spec 3.G.1); the same for floors and ceilings (3.D).
• Utilities serving other areas “shall not transit the SCIF unless mitigated with AO approval” (3.G.3).
• “Electrical Utilities should enter the SCIF at a single point” (3.G.4); UFC 3-4.19 adds that cabling enters “from a single location,” labeled and color-coded by classification.
• Spare conduit is allowed if “filled with acoustic fill and capped” (3.G.6).
• Seal both sides with acoustical foam or sealant “finished to match adjacent wall”; firestop where assemblies are rated (UFC 3-4.11.3).
• Metallic penetrations “may require TEMPEST countermeasures, to include dielectric breaks or grounding, when recommended by the CTTA” (3.G.2).

Ducts: the 96 square inch trigger

Vents or ducts through the perimeter that “exceed 96 square inches shall be protected with permanently affixed bars or grills,” unless “one dimension of the penetration measures less than six inches” (3.G.7). Every duct, regardless of size, still meets the SCIF’s acoustic requirement and is finished tight to the wall.

Man-bars are at least 1/2 in steel, welded vertically and horizontally 6 in on center; 3/4 in #9 expanded metal, 1-1/2 in #10 diamond mesh or 4×4 W2.9 welded wire fabric are alternatives, and permanently installed metal baffles set no more than 6 in apart may replace bars. An access port for inspecting them goes inside the perimeter, or outside with an AO-approved high-security lock.

Pipes, conduit and dielectric breaks

When the TEMPEST Countermeasures Review calls for it, UFC 4-010-05 §3-4.11.2 gives the DoD treatments: a nonconductive union on metal conduit inside the perimeter next to the penetration, or grounding within 6 in of the penetration with a No. 4 wire to the building grounding system; sprinkler and refrigerant lines grounded the same way; and a nonconductive flexible connection on a short section of duct inside the perimeter. At an RF shield the logic reverses: metal is bonded to the shield and openings become waveguides (Chapter 12).

Life safety: two authorities, no override

Every perimeter door must “comply with applicable building code, safety, accessibility standards” as the AHJ determines (3.E.5). Egress from lower-security areas “must not pass through a higher security area” (UFC 3-3.3.2). Delayed egress “is recommended with NFPA 101 compliance,” and FF-L-2890C Types III, IV, VIII and X provide fire-rated panic hardware. Egress must never depend on the access control system or its power supply.

Fire alarm and mass-notification appliances inside the SCIF are life-safety devices whose circuits also cross the perimeter. The FFC asks whether PA, music or notification systems use “fiber isolation, self-amplified speakers, other method to ensure no audio back feed,” and the IDS “shall be separate from, and independent of, fire, smoke, radon, water, and other systems” (7.A.2.h).

STC and NIC in plain English

Sound Transmission Class (STC) is a single number for how well a wall, door or window blocks airborne sound, measured in a laboratory (ASTM E90, rated per E413). Noise Isolation Class (NIC) is the similar number measured between two real rooms in the finished building (ASTM E336). The field number includes every flanking path: over the wall, under the door, through ducts and electrical boxes. The lab number describes the product; the field number describes what you built.

Sound Group 3 and Sound Group 4

Sound Group 3 (STC 45 or better; field NIC 40): “Loud speech from within the SCIF can be faintly heard but not understood outside the SCIF. Normal speech is unintelligible with the unaided human ear.” It is the default perimeter. Sound Group 4 (STC 50 or better; field NIC 45): “Very loud sounds … such as loud singing, brass music, or a radio at full volume, can be heard with the human ear faintly or not at all outside the SCIF.” Rooms with amplified audio such as VTC “must meet Sound Group 4” (UFC 3-4.3.2).

Build it so the field number holds

• Walls true floor to true ceiling; track bedded in sealant; deck flutes filled (Tech Spec wall figures; UFC 3-4.4).
• Insulation “fastened to prevent sliding”; board joints staggered; gaps sealed both sides “with a non-hardening caulk” (UFC 3-4.4.5).
• For STC 50, four layers of 5/8 in GWB (two each side), or factory-laminated GWB meeting ASTM C1766 (UFC 3-4.4.2–3).
• No recessed or back-to-back boxes on perimeter walls (Tech Spec 3.G.5).
• Tested door assemblies with cam-lift hinges; silencers or Z-ducts on every duct and return (UFC 3-4.6.1, 3-4.13).

Testing at accreditation

“With all SCIF doors closed, all perimeter walls and openings … shall be tested along multiple points” to confirm the Sound Group (Tech Spec Ch. 9, as quoted by practitioner sources). Audio (non-instrumental) tests “must be approved by the AO”; instrumental tests are performed only by those trained in audio testing, with results of NIC 40 (Group 3) or NIC 45 (Group 4). The quoted setup places the speaker 6 ft from the wall and 4 ft above the floor, at “loud” or “very loud” speech.

Mitigations and sound masking

When construction cannot reach the Sound Group at a specific weak point, the Tech Spec allows AO-approved structural enhancement, stand-off distance or sound masking. Masking rules (Ch. 9.E, as quoted): transducers “placed close to, or mounted on” the leakage paths; volume set by listening outside until conversations are unintelligible; generators “permanently installed,” with no AM/FM receiver, located within the SCIF; any recording capability disabled; wiring within the perimeter to the greatest extent possible. Masking systems are subject to TSCM evaluation.

What Extent 3 actually means

“Extent of protection” is UL’s term for “the amount of alarm protection installed to protect a particular area, room or container” (UL CS-ASD-NISS instructions). Tech Spec 7.A.2.b: “Installation shall comply with an Extent 3 installation as referenced in UL 2050.” Extent 5 is a reduced, patrol-based level that needs CSA approval under 32 CFR 117.15(d)(4); the Tech Spec offers no Extent 5 option, so it never applies to a SCIF or SAPF. Systems built and used by the U.S. Government need no UL certificate but must still meet Extent 3 installation requirements (7.A.2.c).

Sensors, panel and modes

• Sensors inside the SCIF; failed sensors cause “immediate and continuous alarm activation”; dual-technology sensors only if each technology reports independently.
• The PCU is inside the SCIF, and “only SCIF personnel may initiate changes in access modes” (7.A.3.b(1)); it displays which sensor tripped, holds alarms until cleared locally (auto-reset disabled), and signals power changes locally and at the station.
• Cabling that leaves the SCIF uses encrypted line security or ferrous conduit with permanently sealed joints (no set screws), with junction boxes on GSA-approved locks (7.A.2.e).
• Independent of fire, smoke, radon and water systems (7.A.2.h); no audio or video capability without AO approval (7.A.2.l).
• Modes: only SCI-indoctrinated people arm or disarm; who armed and disarmed is recorded; tamper and emergency-exit circuits stay armed in disarmed mode; failures to arm or disarm are reported and kept two years.

UL 2050 certifies a company, not a product

The CRZH-listed alarm service company completes UL Form CS-ASD-NISS for each protected area, installs and tests, and issues the National Industrial Security System certificate. Contractor SCIFs “shall maintain a current UL certificate of installation and service,” renewed after any IDS change. The current edition is UL 2050 Edition 6 (7 Apr 2025); much public UL guidance was written under Edition 5.

Encryption and the FIPS 140-2 sunset

Transmission to the station uses FIPS-certified encryption: a UL 1610 PCU needs FIPS 197 (AES) or FIPS 140-2; a UL 1076 PCU needs FIPS 140-2 (7.A.3.b(10)). NIST’s CMVP moves FIPS 140-2 validations to the Historical List on 21 September 2026; NIST says historical modules remain supported “for existing systems.”

Acceptance testing: what it should prove

1. Every motion sensor passes the walk test: four steps at one step per second, about 30 in each, alarm on at least 3 of 4 trials.
2. Every HSS alarms before the non-hinged side opens farther than the door’s thickness, emergency exits included.
3. Every equipment cover trips tamper in both modes.
4. Intrusion, failed-sensor, tamper, maintenance and shunt events annunciate at the PCU and the station.
5. Backup transfer without alarm; entry delay ≤ 30 s; defaults changed; encryption end to end.

Two technologies at the door

ICS 705-1 §G.2.b approves “automated access control systems using at least two technologies (badge, PIN, biometric, etc.),” electromechanical or mechanical devices, and personal recognition in small facilities or at a single monitored entrance, and states these methods are not approved for securing SCIF entrances when the SCIF is unoccupied. UFC 3-4.17.1: “At a minimum, provide card reader with keypad at the primary entrance and when provided, the secondary entrance,” with the CAC as the default DoD credential. If ACS and IDS are integrated, ACS notifications rank below IDS alarms (Tech Spec 7.A.2.i).

Where the head-end lives, and how its lines are protected

The Fixed Facility Checklist asks: “Is automated access control system located within a SCIF or an alarmed area controlled at the SECRET level?” It also asks whether transmission lines are “protected by 128-bit encryption/FIPS 140,” whether external devices have tamper protection, and whether “ID data and PINs [are] restricted to SCI-indoctrinated personnel.” A campus server or cloud head-end in unsecured space does not meet this without an AO-approved architecture, and routine remote support by uncleared vendor technicians is ruled out.

Secondary doors go dark when the SCIF closes

Tech Spec 3.E.3: the secondary-door ACS “must be deactivated when the SCIF is not occupied.” Tie deactivation to the closing procedure (for example the IDS arming sequence), not to a clock schedule that drifts and breaks on holidays, and demonstrate the disabled state at acceptance.

PIV, CAC and the federal identity stack

FIPS 201-3 (January 2022) is the current PIV standard; NIST SP 800-116 Rev. 1 maps security areas to factors: Controlled (1, e.g. PKI-CAK), Limited (2, PKI-AUTH + PIN) and Exclusion (3, adding a biometric). A PIV or CAC card plus PIN fits the two-technology rule naturally; a proximity card alone, or a keypad alone, does not. Agencies buy PACS from GSA’s FIPS 201 Approved Products List, where readers are approved only as part of a tested topology.

Platforms, including Hirsch

Integrators often inherit or price against an enterprise platform: Hirsch Velocity, LenelS2 OnGuard, Software House C•CURE 9000, AMAG Symmetry, Genetec Synergis or Gallagher Command Centre, among others. Hirsch (Hirsch Group, formerly Vitaprotech; previously part of Identiv) describes itself as a long-time provider of high-security access control to the U.S. federal government. Per its own datasheets: Velocity 3.9 is the current software release; Mx controllers are UL 294 and UL 1076 listed and use FIPS 140-3 certified cryptography; integrated Mx controllers support two-person rule, occupancy counting, door interlocking (each interlock needs AHJ approval and must not block egress) and anti-passback; and TS ScramblePad readers reorder their keypad digits on each use. Those are manufacturer claims, not AO approvals, and CMVP certificate numbers should be obtained and verified.

Who decides

The Certified TEMPEST Technical Authority reviews plans “to determine if TEMPEST countermeasures are required and recommend solutions” (Tech Spec 3.A.3). UFC 4-010-05 calls the output the TEMPEST Countermeasures Review (TCR), requested through the TEMPEST addendum during planning. The public construction documents state when the CTTA’s direction applies (walls 3.C.3–3.C.4, doors 3.E.5, metallic penetrations 3.G.2, single-point entry 3.G.4) but never list filter ratings or separation distances.

The controlling TEMPEST issuances are named here for orientation only: CNSSP No. 300 (national policy), CNSSI No. 7000 (TEMPEST Countermeasures for Facilities, which defines inspectable space), CNSSAM TEMPEST/1-13 (RED/BLACK Installation Guidance) and CNSSI No. 7003 (Protected Distribution Systems). Their technical content is not public and is not reproduced.

Inspectable space and why many SCIFs aren’t shielded

Inspectable space is the three-dimensional zone around classified equipment that the government can see into and control; the CTTA determines it. RF protection is installed “at the direction of the CTTA when a SCIF utilizes electronic processing and does not provide adequate RF attenuation at the inspectable space boundary” (3.C.4). Outside the U.S. and not under Chief of Mission authority, “TEMPEST countermeasures shall be pre-engineered into the construction” (4.H.1). An unshielded SCIF still depends on basics: label RED and BLACK, never share trays, bundles or patch panels, use fiber where called for, and add no metallic penetrations.

What a power filter does

A power-line filter is a passive low-pass network of inductors and capacitors: 60 Hz passes, RF is blocked and shunted to the metal case, and from there to whatever low-impedance return the case is bonded to — at a shielded room, the shield itself. MIL-HDBK-232A §4.5 (1987, historical) puts the requirement on the return path: it must carry the current and “present minimal impedance to ground to the shunted current at all frequencies of interest.” Where there is no shield, the return is the enclosure and facility ground the design provides, and the CTTA sets the detail. It is rated by insertion loss in dB across a frequency range, bench-tested per MIL-STD-220 with 50-ohm source and load; installed impedances differ, which is why the finished room is tested. Vendor datasheets commonly publish “100 dB class” figures; the level your project needs comes from the CTTA, shield designer and specification, not a catalog.

Mounting, safety and power quality

• Bond the case metal-to-metal on paint-free surfaces; a long round “ground wire” is not an RF bond. Keep input and output wiring physically apart.
• Stored charge: filter capacitors hold charge after the breaker opens. Lock out and tag out, wait the labeled discharge time, verify zero with a rated meter, apply a shorting stick, then open the compartment.
• Leakage: line-to-case capacitors leak small currents that add across filters and phases; that current can nuisance-trip a GFCI upstream of a filter. GFCI placement is an engineer-of-record and AHJ decision. Never lift grounds.
• kVAR: high-capacitance filters can overload a generator, destabilize voltage or prevent startup. Include filter kVAR in generator and UPS sizing and test transfer with filters energized.

Every other conductor and opening

Low-speed signal lines (phone, fire alarm loops, door contacts, readers) get signal-line filters at the penetration panel. High-speed data goes through the shield on all-dielectric fiber in a waveguide, with converters on filtered power; no PoE or copper Ethernet through the wall. At a shield, metal pipe, conduit and tray are welded or bonded and openings are sized as waveguides-beyond-cutoff; ducts get bonded honeycomb vents. At a non-shielded perimeter the logic reverses to a dielectric break or grounding, only where the CTTA directs. Never pass any conductor through a waveguide: a wire in a tube makes a coaxial line with no cutoff.

Portable electronic devices

Tech Spec Chapter 10 covers PEDs with recording capabilities and embedded technologies: approved use, prohibitions, risk levels and mitigation. As summarized from a public edition, low-risk devices have no recording or transmitting capability, medium-risk devices have features that “can be physically disabled,” and high-risk devices need “more extensive or technically complex mitigation”; personally owned devices are prohibited from processing SCI, and medical devices go through separate review. A 30 June 2023 Secretary of Defense memo directed DoD components to program electronic device detection systems and mitigation in all DoD SCIFs and SAPFs by 30 September 2024.

PED lockers sit outside the primary entrance, are never recessed into the perimeter wall, and cannot be within 10 ft of equipment processing unencrypted national security information (UFC 3-4.7).

Detection technology: what each can and cannot see

Telecommunications

Tech Spec Chapter 11 covers unclassified telephones and information systems, CCTV at entry points, wireless, environmental infrastructure, emergency notification, system access, cable control and Protected Distribution Systems. Practical rules for the build team:

• Phones: NCSC’s Telephone Security Group publishes an approved endpoints list for SCIF use; the FFC asks whether speakerphones and microphones are disabled or AO-approved, and whether remote room monitoring is disabled.
• Telecom rooms with encryption equipment go “within or adjacent (shared wall) to the secure area” to minimize PDS (UFC 3-3.3.2).
• PDS (CNSSI 7003) protects unencrypted classified lines crossing lesser areas; “Avoid the use of PDS whenever possible” (UFC 3-4.20). Most IDS and ACS cabling is not PDS.
• Cabling enters at a single location, labeled and color-coded by classification (UFC 3-4.19).
• Wireless anything (locks, readers, sensors, cellular communicators, building-automation radios) needs CTTA evaluation and AO approval. Design wired first.

CCTV at the entrance, never inside

UFC 3-4.17.2: “Cameras are not allowed within the perimeter or enable observation within the perimeter.” An exterior camera at the primary entrance is permitted for remote control of the door from inside, and a video intercom may provide this. Tech Spec Chapters 8.E and 11.D treat CCTV as a supplement to entry control, never a substitute for the lock, the ACS or the IDS.

The Construction Security Plan

“Prior to awarding a construction contract, a CSP for each project shall be developed by the SSM and approved by the AO” (Tech Spec 3.B.1). It documents project identity and adjacencies, Security-in-Depth, control of plans and documents, protection of IDS technical documentation, workforce vetting and badging, escorts and CSTs, site access controls, material procurement and storage, the inspection schedule with hold points, violation reporting, and renovation barriers that segregate workers from operational areas.

Who may design, build and install

• Design: U.S. companies using U.S. citizens or U.S. persons (UFC 1-17).
• Construction: “should be performed by U.S. companies using U.S. citizens … but may be performed by U.S. companies using U.S. persons,” with AO-ensured mitigations (3.B.5).
• IDS installation and testing: “U.S. companies using U.S. citizens” (7.D.1; UFC 1-18.1). U.S. person status does not satisfy this.

Citizenship, U.S. person status and clearance are separate tests. Flow the requirements to every subcontractor.

Site controls and materials

Tech Spec 3.B.6 lists identity verification, random searches at entry and exit, prohibited-item signage, physical barriers and vehicle inspections; “the AO may impose procedures for the procurement, shipping, selection, and secure storage of construction materials” (UFC 4-3). Overseas, controls scale with threat Category: CST start points, cleared finish workers, secure transport and secure storage areas.